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I. INTRODUCTION
Political prediction markets captured the public’s imagination during the
2008 U.S. presidential election cycle. 1 Political prediction markets are a relatively

*
J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, 2010; B.A., Yale University, 2005. I
would like to thank Professor John O. McGinnis and Professor Daniel R. Fischel for their invaluable
insights and guidance, as well as Professor Robert P. Burns, Ira Karoll, Alan Guy, and Owen Keegan
for their support. Thanks also to the staff of The Pepperdine Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship &
the Law for their superb editorial work. Finally, I am forever grateful to my loving family.
1
Public interest in political prediction markets during the 2008 presidential election cycle was
reflected, for example, by two online “blogs”—Freakonomics and Economix—which both kept
frequent track of developments in these markets leading up to the November 4, 2008 election.
Prediction Markets—Freakonomics Blog, http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/tag/predictionmarkets/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2008); Prediction Markets—Economix Blog, http://economix.blogs.
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new market mechanism in which members of the public can trade political event
contracts, 2 which are financial agreements that yield payments based on the
outcome of uncertain events such as the nomination or election of a particular
candidate. 3 Popular interest and optimism about the potential of political
prediction markets reached a pinnacle with the success of these markets in
predicting milestones during the 2008 U.S. presidential election. 4 One of these
markets predicted the exact final Electoral College vote counts for each
presidential candidate. 5 Another market predicted from the start of the presidential
race that the Democratic nominee would win the 2008 popular vote. 6 Moreover,
political prediction markets predicted the 2008 presidential election results more
accurately than conventional forecasting methods such as polling and expert
opinion analysis. 7
The excitement surrounding political prediction markets has been tempered,
however, with concerns about manipulation or attempted manipulation in these
markets. 8 Fear of manipulation may constitute the greatest concern that observers
have about political prediction markets. 9 Currently, no laws in the United States
clearly regulate political prediction markets. 10
The only explicitly legal political prediction markets in the United States are
hosted through the Iowa Electronic Market (“IEM”). 11 The IEM is a non-profit

nytimes.com/tag/prediction-markets/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2008).
2
This Article uses the term “prediction market” because this appears to be the preferred term in the
growing literature. Georgios Tziralis & Ilias Tatsiopoulos, Prediction Markets: An Extended Literature
Review, 1 J. PREDICTION MARKETS 75, 75 (2007) available at http://gtziralis.googlepages.com/
PredictionMarkets_AnExtendedLiteratureReview_TziralisTatsiopoulos.pdf.
3
See generally Kenneth J. Arrow et al., The Promise of Prediction Markets, 320 SCI. MAG. 877,
877 (2008) (defining “event contract”), available at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/320/
5878/877;.see discussion infra Part II.
4
See Joshua Zumbrun, Can Intrade Win After the Election?, FORBES.COM, Nov. 3, 2008,
http://www.forbes.com/2008/11/03/intrade-prediction-markets-biz-beltway-cx_jz_1103intrade.html.
5
Intrade Exchange News, Visual Presentation of Election 2008 Historical Data, Nov. 14, 2008,
http://www.intrade.com/news/news_318.html.
6
Press Release, Henry B. Tippie Coll. of Bus., Univ. of Iowa, Democratic Contract Never Trailed
on IEM’s Winner Take All Prediction Market, Nov. 5, 2008, http://tippie.uiowa.edu/news/story.
cfm?id=2047.
7
For example, whereas the Iowa Electronic Market predicted the final vote count in the 2008
presidential election to within a half percentage point, the average absolute error by public opinion polls
was 1.2%. Press Release, Henry B. Tippie Coll. of Bus., Univ. of Iowa, IEM Within Less Than Half
Percentage Point in Presidential Race Prediction, Nov. 24, 2008, http://tippie.uiowa.edu/
news/story.cfm?id=2058.
8
See discussion infra Part III.
9
See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: HOW MANY MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE 137 (2006); see
generally Note, Prediction Markets and Law: A Skeptical Account, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1223–24
(2009) (identifying the vulnerability of political prediction markets to manipulation in the context of
discussing failures of these markets).
10
Ricky McRoskey, Regulation Looms for Prediction Markets, BUS. WK., July 7, 2008, available
at http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/jul2008/db2008073_533950.htm?chan=top+
news_top+news+index_news+%2B+analysis; see generally Miriam A. Cherry & Robert L. Rogers,
Prediction Markets and the First Amendment, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 833, 835, 841 (2008) (arguing that
legal uncertainty is an impediment to the development of public prediction markets generally).
11
Robert Hahn & Paul Tetlock, Op-Ed., Short Odds for Ignorance, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2006, at
A1.
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prediction market exchange that permits limited real-money trading. 12 Event
contract trading on the IEM is permitted by virtue of two no-action letters issued
by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”). 13 Intrade, which is
one of the most well-known for-profit, real-money political prediction market
exchanges, is incorporated in Ireland. 14 The absence of a legal framework has
suppressed the development of these markets in the United States, 15 and has
arguably reduced the opportunities that these markets have to encourage broader
participation, aggregate information, and improve decision-making. 16 Numerous
participants in the prediction market industry have pleaded for regulatory clarity. 17
In the spring of 2008, the CFTC sought public commentary in the form of a
Concept Release on the appropriate regulatory treatment of event contracts traded
on prediction markets generally. 18 The CFTC issued this call for public comment
in response to a “substantial number of requests for guidance on the propriety of
trading various event contracts under the regulatory rubric of the Commodity
Exchange Act (“CEA” or “Act”).” 19 Leaders in the prediction market industry are
hopeful that legal clarity from the CFTC will improve public confidence in these
markets and increase market liquidity through a significantly higher volume of
trading. 20
As part of its review, the CFTC is currently examining whether political
event contracts should be prohibited, or deserve special treatment, under the CEA,
“due to the nature and importance of their outcomes.” 21 The CFTC is also
analyzing whether any types of market participants or trading practices exist on
prediction markets generally that should be prohibited or closely monitored by
regulators. 22 The agency was expected to issue a response to questions posed in
the Concept Release during 2009 in the form of an interpretive statement, a
proposed rulemaking, or an exemptive order, but as of early 2010 the agency has
issued no response at all. 23

12
Frequently Asked Questions—Iowa Electronic Markets—The University of Iowa, http://www.
biz.uiowa.edu/iem/faq.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2008).
13
Id. A no-action letter is a discretionary written statement issued to a specific futures exchange
by the staff of a Division of the CFTC or the Office of the General Counsel, stating that the Division or
Office will not recommend enforcement action to the CFTC against the futures exchange for the
exchange’s failure to comply with a specific provision of the Commodities Exchange Act or a
Commission rule. 17 C.F.R. §§ 140.99(a)(2), 140.99(b) (West 2009).
14
See Intrade.com—Help, http://www.intrade.com/jsp/intrade/help/index.jsp?page=howitworks.
html (last visited Nov. 9, 2008).
15
See Arrow et al., supra note 3, at 877–78.
16
Id. at 878.
17
See, e.g., Melonyce McAfee, Are “Political Futures” Illegal?, SLATE, Apr. 27, 2007,
http://www.slate.com/toolbar.aspx?action=print&id=2164916.
18
Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts, 73 Fed. Reg.
25,669, (May 7, 2008).
19
Id.
20
Zumbrun, supra note 4.
21
Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts, 73 Fed. Reg. at
25,673.
22
Id. at 25,674.
23
E-mails from Bruce Fekrat, Special Counsel, Office of the Director, Division of Market
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Prediction market scholars disagree about whether the CFTC legally can
regulate public prediction markets generally under the CEA, 24 or whether state
gambling laws should regulate these markets. 25 This Article does not address
these questions. Rather, this Article argues that if the CFTC acquires jurisdiction
over political prediction markets specifically, it must abandon the CEA’s antimanipulation jurisprudence toward these markets. This argument is raised because
the CEA’s regulatory rubric is incoherent when applied to the types of activities
and effects that market analysts, participants and observers consider manipulative
in political prediction markets.
The incoherence results because the concepts of artificial price and specific
intent to influence market price that are central to the CEA’s anti-manipulation
jurisprudence are inapplicable in the context of political prediction markets. After
abandoning the CEA’s anti-manipulation jurisprudence, the CFTC will have at
least three options with regard to regulating the manipulation we worry about in
political prediction markets: it can develop a revised anti-manipulation doctrine
with elements that are coherent when applied to political election markets; it can
encourage private contracting between market participants to prohibit certain
trading activities; or it can take no action and simply allow political prediction
markets themselves to control manipulation through self-deterrence mechanisms.
Part II of this Article offers a brief background to prediction markets
generally. Part III catalogues five examples of activity considered manipulative in
political prediction markets, and draws conclusions about the types of trading
activities that trouble market analysts. Part IV addresses the CEA’s current antimanipulation jurisprudence, and explains why this jurisprudence is incoherent
when applied to manipulation in political prediction markets. Part V suggests
three alternatives to the CEA’s anti-manipulation jurisprudence to control
manipulation in political prediction markets: a new regulatory scheme, private
contractual enforcement, or self-deterrence. Part VI concludes by urging the
CFTC, if it acquires jurisdiction over political prediction markets, to exercise
Oversight, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, to Alexandra Lee Newman, J.D. Candidate,
Northwestern University School of Law (Oct. 9, 2008, 11:56 CST, Jan. 14, 2009, 08:56 CST, and Oct.
13, 2009, 09:13 CST) (on file with author).
24
For arguments favoring CFTC regulation, see generally MICHAEL ABRAMOWICZ,
PREDICTOCRACY 50 (2007); Robert W. Hahn & Paul C. Tetlock, A New Approach for Regulating
Information Markets, 29 J. REG. ECON. 265, 268, 272–80 (2006); Paul Architzel, Event Markets Evolve:
Legal Certainty Needed, FUTURES INDUSTRY, Mar.–Apr. 2006, at 53, available at http://www.future
sindustry.org/downloads/fimag/2006/marapr06/Mar-Apr_EventMarkets.pdf; Kenneth J. Arrow et al.,
Statement on Prediction Markets 2 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper,
2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=984584. For arguments opposing CFTC regulation, see
generally Tom W. Bell, Private Prediction Markets and the Law, 3 J. PREDICTION MARKETS 89 (2009),
available at http://tomwbell.com/writings/PrivatePMs&theLaw.pdf [hereinafter Bell, Private Prediction
Markets]; Tom W. Bell, Prediction Markets for Promoting the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts,
14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 37, 67–77 (2006); Tom W. Bell, Architzel on Legality of Prediction Markets,
Mar. 29, 2006, http://agoraphilia.blogspot.com/2006/03/architzel-on-legality-of-prediction.html [herein
after Bell, Science and the Useful Arts].
25
See generally, e.g., Tom W. Bell, Gambling for the Good, Trading for the Future: The Legality
of Markets in Science Claims, 5 CHAP. L. REV. 159, 165–67 (2002) (arguing that prediction markets are
distinct from gambling); Ryan P. McCarthy, Comment, Information Markets as Games of Chance, 155
U. PA. L. REV. 749, 755 (2007). But cf. Christopher T. Pickens, Comment, Of Bookies and Brokers:
Are Sports Futures Gambling or Investing, and Does It Even Matter?, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 227,
269 (2006) (arguing that a distinction between gambling and investing is nonsensical because the
activities “are too similar to distinguish categorically”).
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restraint in the regulation of manipulative trading, in order to promote further
experimentation and development of these markets.
II. BACKGROUND TO PREDICTION MARKETS
Public prediction markets, of which political prediction markets are a type,
are markets in which members of the public can trade event contracts, which are
financial agreements that yield payments based on the outcome of uncertain
events. 26 A public prediction market is contrasted with a private or “in-house”
prediction market, where the prediction market is only open to members of a
particular firm. 27 The uncertain event that lays the foundation for the event
contract on a public prediction market can range from the results of a presidential
election to the occurrence of a scientific discovery to the length of a celebrity
marriage. 28
A typical event contract in a political prediction market specifies a single
uncertain event as follows: “Barack Obama to be elected President of the United
States in 2008.” Only two possibilities exist for the outcome of this contract:
either Barack Obama will be elected President of the United States in 2008, or he
will not. This type of event contract is known as a binary-option contract, 29 and it
is the most prevalent type of event contract traded today. The name reflects the
fact that there are only two possibilities for the outcome of the contract.
To participate in a typical public prediction market, a buyer purchases a
binary-option contract from a market sponsor such as the IEM or Intrade, which
issues contracts linked to various event outcomes and facilitates trades between
buyers and sellers. 30 The price that the buyer pays for the contract indicates the
lowest probability at which the buyer thinks the event will occur (the buyer wants
to buy the contract for the lowest possible price). 31 The seller will sell the share at
a price that exceeds his purchase price, and the seller’s willingness to sell the
contract at the buyer’s offered price indicates the highest probability at which the
seller thinks the event will occur (the seller naturally wants to obtain the highest
price possible for the sale of the contract). 32 When all of the event contracts for a

26
Arrow et al., supra note 3, at 877. For additional background information, see generally, e.g.,
Miriam A. Cherry & Robert L. Rogers, Markets for Markets: Origins and Subjects of Information
Markets, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 339 (2006) (providing in-depth introduction to prediction markets).
27
Bell, Private Prediction Markets, supra note 24, at 14.
28
Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts, 73 Fed. Reg. at,
25,670.
29
Id. Binary-option contracts are traded on both the IEM and Intrade.
30
These market sponsors, which are often online forums, are analogous to the clearing houses
familiar in the commodity futures contract trading context. See generally U.S. Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, The Economic Purpose of Futures Markets and How They Work
http://www.cftc.gov/educationcenter/economicpurpose.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2010) (“Futures trades
that are made on an exchange are cleared through a clearing organization (clearing house), which acts
as the buyer to all sellers and the seller to all buyers.”).
31
See generally Michael Abramowicz, Information Markets, Administrative Decisionmaking, and
Predictive Cost-Benefit Analysis, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 933, 934–44 (2004) (“The prices at which these
transactions occur, as well as the bid and ask prices, reflect market predictions of the eventual payout
and thus of the number or numbers on which that payout is based.”).
32
Id.
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specific event are aggregated on a prediction market, the price of the event contract
on the market represents the average perceived likelihood that the event will
actually occur—this is the “aggregated expected probability” of the event. 33
For example, the buyer selects the event in which she is interested—”Barack
Obama to be elected President of the United States in 2008.” This binary-option
contract will pay $1 if Barack Obama is elected, but will pay $0 if he is not
elected. Therefore, if the buyer purchases the contract for $0.85, the buyer has
expressed her belief that Barack Obama has an 85% or greater chance of winning
the 2008 U.S. presidential election. By selling the contract for $0.85, the seller has
indicated his belief that the price of the Barack Obama contract will not exceed
$0.85, and that Barack Obama has less than an 85% chance of being elected. If
Barack Obama is actually elected, the buyer will receive $1, thus making $0.15
profit on that event contract. Market participants who bought contracts favoring
other presidential candidates will receive nothing.
The virtues of public prediction markets are manifold. Functioning as
“information aggregation vehicles,” 34 prediction markets may boast predictive
accuracy exceeding the precision of other predictive processes such as
deliberation, 35 polling, or expert opinion-making. 36 For example, one research
study found that political prediction markets are more accurate long-run
forecasting tools in political elections than political polls both across elections and
across long periods of time preceding elections. 37 This study aggregated over 964
polls from the five U.S. presidential elections since 1988, and concluded that the
political prediction market was closer to the final two-party vote split 74% of the
time. 38 This study also concluded that the political prediction market significantly
outperformed the polls in each of these elections when forecasting more than 100
days in advance of the election. 39
Cass Sunstein argues that this predictive accuracy arises because prediction
markets provide incentives for the disclosure of information. 40 He theorizes:
Precisely because many people are making purchasing decisions, their aggregate

33
The term “aggregated expected probability” appears in Chris F. Masse’s prediction market blog,
CFM = Prediction Markets—Vortal to Prediction Markets, http://www.chrisfmasse.com (last visited
Mar. 11, 2009).
34
Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts, 73 Fed. Reg. at
25,670.
35
SUNSTEIN, supra note 9, at 104.
36
See Arrow et al., supra note 3, at 877; Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, 18 J.
ECON. PERSP. 107, 108 (2004). The methods and processes of information aggregation in public
prediction markets is currently an active area for empirical investigation. See Katarína Kálovcová, Why
Betting and Prediction Markets Work (Not) Well: An Inventory of Open Questions, 19–20 (CERGE-EI,
Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 2007-178, 2007), available at http://home.cerge-ei.cz/kalovcova/
files/dp.pdf.
37
Joyce E. Berg et al., Prediction Market Accuracy in the Long Run, 24 INT’L J. FORECASTING
285, 286 (2008), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=MImg&_imagekey=B6V924SCTMTB-1H&_cdi=5886&_user=1458830&_orig=search&_coverDate=06%2F30%2F2008&_sk=999759997&vi
ew=c&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkzk&md5=432bb517cf9e9ac013d22dc6822b18ef&ie=/sdarticle.pdf.
38
Id. at 287.
39
Id.
40
SUNSTEIN, supra note 9, at 104.
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judgments are highly likely to be correct, at least if most purchasers have relevant
information. And simply because purchasers are purchasers, and hence are willing
to put money on the line, they probably do have some such information, at least
most of the time. . . . When people are willing to put their money where their mouth
is, there is an increased likelihood that they will be right. 41

The information aggregation feature of prediction markets is enhanced by the fact
that these markets have the potential to be completely objective since “they
provide financial incentive for honest predictions.” 42
Information aggregation can occur quickly, which is another virtue of the
markets. 43 For example, on November 8, 1995, at 8:10 a.m. CST, Colin Powell
announced that he would be holding a press conference later that afternoon, but
revealed no explicit information about the content of that conference. 44 Traders on
the IEM reacted quickly to this announcement, and within minutes the price of the
Colin Powell Nomination Market for the 1996 Republican National Convention
dropped from $0.60 to almost zero. 45 This drop occurred more than seven hours in
advance of the press conference at which Powell actually made the announcement
that he would not campaign for the nomination. 46
While rapid information aggregation is the most prominent virtue of public
prediction markets, scholars postulate other virtues as well. Public prediction
markets may promote free speech, 47 democratic deliberation, 48 public decision
making, 49 scientific progress, 50 and risk management. 51 Given these potential
virtues, it is no wonder that some scholars “wish that anything even remotely
resembling a prediction market be free to thrive, in order that this important field
might enjoy the optimal conditions for growth.” 52
Other commentators, however, are more cautious in their enthusiasm for
prediction markets. For example, one scholar has observed that prediction markets
are valuable only as long as they maintain a competitive advantage in making
41

Id. at 121.
Abramowicz, supra note 31, at 971. For a famous version of the argument that betting
encourages the expression of objective belief, see generally IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE
REASON 687 (Paul Guyer & Allen W. Wood eds., trans., 1998).
43
Joyce E. Berg et al., The Iowa Electronic Markets: Stylized Facts and Open Issues, in
INFORMATION MARKETS: A NEW WAY OF MAKING DECISIONS 142, 152 (Robert W. Hahn & Paul C.
Tetlock eds., 2006), available at http://reg-markets.org/admin/authorpdfs/redirect-safely.php?fname=../
pdffiles/phpoY.pdf; see also Yiling Chen et al., Information Markets vs. Opinion Polls: An Empirical
Comparison 9 (Working Paper, 2005) (“[I]nformation markets can provide real-time predictions, which
are hardly achievable through resorting to experts.”).
44
Berg, supra note 43, at 152.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
See Cherry & Rogers, supra note 10, at 835, 875.
48
See John O. McGinnis, Who Will Be President?, WALL ST. J., July 11, 2008, at A13; John O.
McGinnis, A Democracy of Accelerating Technology 22 (Working Paper, 2008); SUNSTEIN, supra note
9, at vii.
49
Robert W. Hahn & Paul C. Tetlock, Using Information Markets to Improve Public Decision
Making, 29 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 213 (2005).
50
See Bell, Science and the Useful Arts, supra note 24.
51
See Arrow et al., supra note 3, at 877.
52
Cherry & Rogers, supra note 10, at 835, 878.
42
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accurate predictions relative to other forecasting models—”[a] highly accurate set
of prediction markets has little value if some other meta predictive mechanism(s)
can provide similar accuracy at a lower cost, or if very few substantial decisions
are influenced by accurate predictions on its topic.” 53
Another concern is that prediction markets may merely reflect information
that is already available, rather than actually predict new information. 54 In one
recent study, economists postulated that the 2008 U.S. presidential prediction
markets merely reacted to the release of polling information, and did not actually
anticipate any significant changes in voter sentiment. 55
Moreover, prediction markets may be susceptible to various types of “foul
play,” including lying, sabotage, embezzlement, retribution, vulnerability to
bubbles or information cascades, bias, or other possible weaknesses. 56 Market
observers are also concerned about particular applications of prediction markets,
such as those used to predict terrorist attacks, assassinations, and nuclear missile
attacks. 57
This Article does not address these concerns, but rather focuses on the legal
concept of manipulation as it pertains to trading activities on political prediction
markets. Part III offers five examples of activities and effects that market analysts
have considered manipulative in political prediction markets.
III. EXAMPLES OF MANIPULATION IN POLITICAL PREDICTION MARKETS
Over the past several years, political prediction market analysts in the
popular media and academia have identified activities constituting manipulation in
these markets. Most commentators identifying manipulated markets have not
explicitly defined the term manipulation. However, it appears that all of these
commentators have implicitly adopted the definition of manipulation recently
asserted by Paul W. Rhode and Koleman S. Strumpf. 58 Rhode and Strumpf define
manipulation in political prediction markets as a “speculative attack that achieves
its objective of changing prices” that is “usually not possible unless the trades

53

CFM = Prediction Markets, supra note 33.
See ABRAMOWICZ, supra note 24, at 38.
55
David S. Lee & Enrico Moretti, Learning in Investment Decisions: Evidence from Prediction
Markets and Polls 2 (Am. Econ. Ass’n, Working Paper, 2008), available at http://www.aeaweb.org/
annual_mtg_papers/2009/retrieve.php?pdfid=360.
56
See generally Yiling Chen et al., Bluffing and Strategic Reticence in Prediction Markets 1
(Working Paper, 2007) available at http://www.yiling.seas.harvard.edu/files/wine082.pdf (“[T]here
exist circumstances when traders can benefit by either hiding information (reticence) or lying about
information (bluffing).”); Robin Hanson, Foul Play in Information Markets, in INFORMATION
MARKETS, supra note 43, at 126, 130 (analyzing various forms of foul play in prediction markets);
Note, Prediction Markets and Law, supra note 9, at 1221-24 (identifying situations where prediction
markets “go wrong”).
57
See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 9, at 106-08 (providing background information on the
controversial Policy Analysis Market).
58
Paul W. Rhode & Koleman S. Strumpf, Manipulating Political Stock Markets: A Field
Experiment and a Century of Observational Data 6 (Working Paper, 2008), available at
http://www.unc.edu/~cigar/papers/ManipIHT_June2008(KS).pdf.
54
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influence the beliefs of other market participants.” 59 A speculative attack is “any
trade uninformed by fundamentals, intended to change prices,” and a fundamental
is “any information that influences the underlying value of the contract.” 60
Pursuant to this definition, political prediction market commentators find in
the five examples below that attempted manipulation has occurred when it appears
that a trader has purchased contracts attempting to influence the perception that
other people have about the viability of a particular candidate. Manipulation is
successful when these perceptions actually are influenced. The manipulative
trader does not necessarily purchase contracts with the hope of making a profit. In
fact, the manipulative trader often loses money on the trade, even intentionally,
and is unable to affect the price of the contract substantially or in the long-term.
A. September/October 2008: “John McCain Wins Presidency” Contracts on
Intrade
In September and October, 2008, trading activity occurred in the John
McCain contract on Intrade that raised concerns. As Intrade CEO John Delaney
described the questionable trading, “[m]ultiple large volume Buy orders placed and
matched rapidly caused the McCain market to move significantly above the
previously prevailing market price by up to 10 pts,” while at the same time
“[m]ultiple large volume Sell orders placed and matched rapidly caused the Obama
market to move significantly below the previously prevailing market price by up to
9 pts.” 61
From a public relations perspective, Delaney analyzed these transactions by
explaining that a single “institutional” investor on Intrade had purchased a large
number of McCain contracts in order to “manage certain risks.” 62 Other market
observers, however, described the trading as “manipulative.” 63 The New York
Times reported that the price of McCain contracts on Intrade was up to ten points
higher than the price of McCain stock on other large online prediction markets
such as Britain’s BetFair market. 64 The discrepancies between the same types of
contracts on different election prediction markets raised concerns about the
integrity of these markets.
One commentator observed that this price discrepancy between the different
public prediction markets created arbitrage opportunities. 65 This type of

59

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
61
John Delaney, http://delaneyintrade.blogspot.com/2008_10_01_archive.html (Oct. 16, 2008,
06:40 EST).
62
Id.
63
See generally Noam Cohen, Trading Variance in Election Predictions Raises Questions, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 19, 2008, at B4 (discussing John Delaney’s response to allegations of market
manipulation).
64
Id.
65
Nate Silver, Intrade Betting is Suspicious, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT: POLITICS DONE RIGHT, Sept. 24,
2008, http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2008/09/intrade-betting-is-suspcious.html (last visited Feb. 24,
2010). Arbitrage is “the simultaneous buying and selling of identical securities in different markets,
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opportunity was found on September 24, 2008—the Obama contract on Intrade
was trading at 52.3, suggesting that Obama had a 52.3% chance of being elected
president. 66 At the same time, on the BetFair prediction market site, Obama
contracts were trading at 1.62, suggesting that Obama had a 61.7% chance of
winning the presidency. 67 A savvy investor could make a substantial profit by
purchasing Obama contracts for a lower price on Intrade and then selling them for
a higher price on BetFair.
The Wall Street Journal observed that in addition to price disparity with
other markets, McCain contracts were being traded at high volume during unusual
times, such as early in the morning, during periods of relative political calm. 68
Such timing raised concerns that a manipulator’s hand was involved.
The New York Times offered a “political explanation” for the increased value
of McCain contracts to explain the trading activity of those contracts:
The political explanation—that someone was trying to game the system to give Mr.
McCain some momentum—has the advantage of at least appearing rational to
economists. Increasing a candidate’s perceived standing would be something of
value to offset the irrational decision to waste money buying a share in Mr. McCain
for more than the absolute minimum price. 69

Similarly, Justin Wolfers of the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton
School of Business noted that whoever bought the large number of McCain
contracts was “obviously someone who want[ed] good news for McCain.” 70 As
reported in the Wall Street Journal:
[T]he trader placing the suspicious orders moved the contracts to price levels that
weren’t sustained, so it’s nearly impossible that they made money on the
transaction. That suggests to us that the trader had an ulterior motive, such as a
desire to raise Sen. McCain’s stock and alter the public perception of how the
horserace was unfolding. 71

The fact that the non-manipulative prediction market participants quickly
identified the manipulative inflationary trading of the McCain contract meant that
the manipulative trader likely lost thousands of dollars. 72 This suggests that the
manipulative trader had incentives that went beyond financial gain from the
market.
Highlighting the possibility of unsavory motivations held by manipulative
traders, Nate Silver of the political blog fivethirtyeight.com observed that on
(8th ed. 2004).
66
Silver, supra note 65.
67
Id.
68
David Rothschild & Justin Wolfers, Market Manipulation Muddies Election Outlook, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 2, 2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122283114935193363.html.
69
Cohen, supra note 63.
70
Josh Rogin, Trader Drove Up Price of McCain ‘Stock’ in Online Market, CONG. Q., Oct. 21,
2008, available at http://www.cqpolitics.com/wmspage.cfm?docID=news-000002976265&referrer=js.
71
Rothschild & Wolfers, supra note 68.
72
Elizabeth Dickinson, Future Perfect, FOREIGN POL’Y, Oct. 2008, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
story/cms.php?story_id=4541&page=1.
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September 22, 2008, a “rogue trader” who bought large volumes of McCain
contracts was also purchasing Hillary Clinton contracts. 73 Silver hypothesized that
“someone is betting on some sort of disqualifying event happening to Obama,” 74
and he encouraged the FBI to uncover the rogue trader’s identity. 75
These various analyses suggest that whereas a rational economic actor would
not risk losing money by purchasing McCain contracts for more than their market
value, a rational political actor would purchase a large number of McCain’s
Intrade contracts to make the probability of a McCain victory appear higher to
outside observers. The goal of the manipulative trader would be to influence the
beliefs that other market observers had about the viability of McCain’s candidacy.
B. May 2007: “Hillary Clinton Wins Presidency” Contracts on Intrade
In May 2007, economist Eric Zitzewitz observed that the “Hillary Clinton for
President” contract, which had been trading consistently between twenty-three and
twenty-six points on Intrade, suddenly increased to forty points around May 12. 76
With her odds of winning the Democratic nomination hovering around fifty
percent, these numbers implied that, if nominated, Hillary Clinton’s chance of
winning the presidency would be about eighty percent. 77
Zitzewitz noted that this price was “clearly ridiculous” for two reasons: first,
“[y]ou could sell the President contracts of Hillary, Obama, Gore, and Edwards for
a combined 69 (40+17+8+4) and buy the ‘Democrat to win’ contract for 56,” and
second, “[s]ince there was no movement in the nomination contract, the
conditional probability of Hillary was now a ridiculous 40/52 = 77%, while the
conditional probability of ‘Not Hillary’ was 16/48 = 33%.” 78 The first reason
raised red flags because it defied logic why an aggregated bundle of contracts
indicating that one of the four major Democratic candidates would win the
presidency would cost substantially more than a single contract predicting
generally that a Democrat would win. The second reason was odd because the
conditional contract predicting that Clinton would win the presidency if she were
nominated suggested that Clinton was a significantly more popular candidate than
the contract predicting the likelihood of her nomination suggested.
Additionally, Zitzewitz observed that the “Hillary Clinton for President”
contract price stayed at forty points for about a week on higher than normal
volume, suggesting that someone was putting a very large amount of money into
the market and sustaining that investment at a high level. 79 Overall, Zitzewitz
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Silver, supra note 65.
Id.
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Eric Zitzewitz, Manipulation Can Affect Prices, May 30, 2007, http://www.midasoracle.org/
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concluded that this market participant spent $10,000 to increase the price of
“Hillary Clinton for President” contracts by twelve points over the course of two
weeks. 80
Similar to the John McCain contract above, 81 the question arises whether a
Hillary Clinton supporter was trying to manipulate the market to make Clinton’s
success in the market a self-fulfilling prophecy at the polls, or whether a rival
candidate was trying to make the Clinton camp look manipulative. 82 At any rate,
astute Intrade investors who noticed the overvalued “Hillary Clinton for President”
contracts had the opportunity, even two weeks after the start of the allegedly
manipulative activity, to make “free money” by selling their contracts purchased
before the activity at the “true” price of twenty-six points to other market
participants who bid for “Hillary Clinton for President” contracts valued at thirtythree points and higher after the attempted manipulation.
C. October 2004: “George W. Bush Wins Presidency” Contracts on
TradeSports
Prediction market analysts also observed attempted manipulation in the fall
of 2004 “George W. Bush Wins Presidency” contracts on TradeSports (formerly
part of Intrade). 83 Economists Paul Rhode and Koleman Strumpf summarize the
trades as follows:
Shortly after 2:30 pm (EDT) on Friday, October 15, 2004, the TradeSports odds
price on the re-election of President Bush began to fall precipitously. From a
plateau of 54 points at 2:30 pm, a series of thirty trades in less than a second
dropped the price to 48 at 2:31 pm. After stabilizing for two minutes, another rapid
set of trades led prices to tumble to 10 at 2:33 pm. Thus prices fell by 44 points in
just three minutes, suggesting that Bush went from a slight favorite to serious
underdog. 84

Rhode and Strumpf note that the manipulator spent around $20,000 in an
attempt to alter the market, but likely did not make any profit from his efforts. 85
The price impact of these trades was reversed within twenty-four hours. 86
Discussing the trader’s motivations, one commentator suggested, “either
someone was drunk, or a political hack made a crass attempt to change the
odds.” 87 Rhode and Strumpf wrote:
This sharp drop was the most dramatic of a series of trades that National Review
Online blogger Donald Luskin soon charged were politically-motivated speculative
attacks on Bush futures “to sway the election towards Kerry.” Reports circulated
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Harford, supra note 77.
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that George Soros was behind the October 15 plunge as well as earlier bear raids on
Bush. Such rumors gained currency when a TradeSports press release, publicized
in Wall Street Journal and Time, confirmed that the large trades of a single investor
produced the October 15 price moves. The press release asserted “Bush contract
has become the battle ground of wills between a cadre of large, well financed rogue
traders seemingly bent on driving down the Bush re-election contract and a
growing list of financial traders who think they can predict the outcome of this
election.” 88

Under the Rhode and Strumpf definition of attempted manipulation, the
trader sought to influence the political decisions of market observers, and to use
market prices as a means of doing so.
D. Year 2000: “Patrick Buchanan for President” Contracts on IEM
Cass Sunstein observed that an attempt to manipulate a political prediction
market occurred during the 2000 presidential election. 89 The value of the contracts
for Patrick Buchanan increased suddenly after a group of traders bought large
volumes of these contracts, but the price soon dropped when other “well-informed
traders” sold these contracts for a profit. 90 Sunstein does not define the meaning of
attempted manipulation, but from his description it appears that he implicitly
adopted the Rhode and Strumpf definition. Sunstein’s description suggests that
manipulation involves an effort to increase the price of a candidate’s contracts
through high-volume purchasing to signal the candidate’s popularity to other
market observers.
E. Year 1999: “FDP Party to Win Berlin State Election” Contracts on
Wahl$treet
Economists Jan Hansen, Carsten Schmidt and Martin Strobel identified
unusual trading activity in political prediction markets that were run during the
1999 Berlin state election. 91 Two independent political prediction markets were
conducted to predict the outcome of this election. 92 One of these markets, the
Walboerse market run through the Humboldt University Berlin and the newspaper
Berliner Zeitung, took about one week to enroll new market participants. 93 In
contrast, the Wahl$treet prediction market run through the daily newspapers Der

88
Rhode & Strumpf, supra note 58, at 2-3 (citing Donald Luskin, Who’s Behind the Bush-Futures
Attacks?, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Oct. 18, 2004, http://www.nationalreview.com/nrof_luskin/ luskin2004
10181132.asp; Donald Luskin, Bush Futures Being Manipulated, Oct. 16, 2004, http://www.poorand
stupid.com/2004_10_10_chronArchive.asp; Amanda Ripley, Let’s Make This Vote Interesting, Shall
We?, TIME, Nov. 1, 2004, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/ 0,9171,995538,00.
html; Bids and Offers, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 2004, at C4).
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SUNSTEIN, supra note 9, at 137-38.
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APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 459 (2004), available at http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~db=
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Tagesspiegel and Berliner Morgenpost enabled new market participants to trade
instantly upon enrollment. 94 All three of the newspapers involved published the
daily results of the vote share-contracts on the first page of their Berlin editions for
six weeks preceding the election. 95
The headquarters of the liberal Free Democratic Party (“FDP”) party sent out
an email message to all Berlin FDP party members eleven days prior to the
election. 96 In this email, party members were encouraged to enroll in the
Wahl$treet prediction market and to purchase FDP party stock, in order to increase
the demand, and thus the price, of the FDP contracts on the Wahl$treet market. 97
Discussing these political stock markets (“PSMs”), the email read:
The Tagesspiegel is publishing a PSM on a daily basis, according to which the FDP
is traded at 4.23% at the moment. You find the PSM on the internet at
http://berlin.wahlstreet.de. Many citizens do not think of the PSM as a game, but
consider it a result of opinion polls. Hence, it is important that the price of the FDP
will rise during the last days. As is the case with every exchange, the price level is
a result of the demand. Please participate at the PSM and buy FDP contracts.
Eventually, we are all convinced of the success of our party. 98

Shortly after this email was sent, the FDP prices began to increase slowly on
the Wahl$treet market, up until the day of the last newspaper announcement of the
After the final
Wahl$treet prediction price favoring the FDP party. 99
announcement at 4:00 p.m. on the eve of the election day, the FDP price at
Wahl$treet fell by thirty percent, suggesting that people had purchased FDP
contracts solely to increase the reported probability of an FDP victory. 100
Strikingly, similar price increases did not occur on the Wahlboerse market where
enrollment was not instantaneous, as it was on Wahl$treet. 101
Like the other examples above, the discussion of the 1999 Berlin state
election conforms to Rhode and Strumpf’s definition of manipulation. The FDP
party organizers sought to influence the beliefs of external market observers by
increasing the price of the FDP contract, hoping that a higher contract price would
motivate observers to support the FDP at the polls. Rhode and Strumpf note that a
manipulator’s actions in increasing the price of a contract “might influence the
choice of undecided voters, either directly or through the media.” 102 Because of
this influence, some scholars suggest that an extreme solution to avoiding
manipulative effects in political prediction markets is to prevent media coverage of
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prediction market results. 103 It is unlikely that such a solution would be viable or
even legal in the United States. 104
IV. THE INCOHERENCE OF THE CEA’S ANTI-MANIPULATION JURISPRUDENCE AS
APPLIED TO POLITICAL PREDICTION MARKETS
The five examples of trading activities in political prediction markets above
comply with the Rhode and Strumpf definition of manipulation, which heavily
emphasizes the trader’s hope that the trades will influence the beliefs of other
market participants through the price changes in the market, regardless of whether
the manipulative trader sought to or actually did make a profit. 105 This concept of
manipulation is markedly different from the CEA’s anti-manipulation doctrine.
Whereas the adopted concept of manipulation in political prediction markets
depends on the attempt or ability to influence external beliefs, the CEA’s doctrine
depends upon the concepts of artificial price and specific intent to influence the
market price. In what follows, this Article summarizes the CEA’s antimanipulation doctrine, and argues that the CEA’s concepts of artificial price and
specific intent to influence the market price are incoherent as applied to political
prediction markets. No other prediction market commentator has engaged in this
type of sustained analysis of why the CEA’s traditional doctrine of manipulation in
commodity futures market is incoherent when applied to public prediction
markets. 106 This Article argues that if the CFTC eventually acquires jurisdiction
over political prediction markets, it must abandon the CEA’s anti-manipulation
jurisprudence in the context of regulating political prediction markets, because the
CEA’s regulatory rubric is incoherent when applied to the types of activities that
market analysts consider to be manipulation in political prediction markets.
A. Background to the CEA’s Anti-Manipulation Jurisprudence
The CFTC operates pursuant to the CEA, which regulates the trading of
commodities markets in the United States. 107 Under the CEA, the CFTC has
exclusive jurisdiction over commodity options and commodity futures contracts. 108
103
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107
Commodity Exchange Act § 1, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-27 (2006).
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25,670. Section 4c(b) of the CEA gives the CFTC plenary jurisdiction over commodity options, and
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If public prediction markets fall under the jurisdiction of the CFTC and are
regulated under the CEA, then the question arises whether the CEA’s antimanipulation jurisprudence can apply to political prediction markets.
The CEA does not contain any explicit statutory definition of the term
manipulation. 109 However, § 13(a)(2) makes it a felony for “[a]ny person to
manipulate or attempt to manipulate the price of any commodity in interstate
commerce,” and § 13(b) specifically prohibits “[a]ny person [from]
manipulate[ing] or attempt[ing] to manipulate the price of any commodity in
interstate commerce, or for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any
registered entity.” 110 Congress may have intentionally left the term manipulation
undefined, because it wanted to cast a wide net and cover all types of conduct that
someone seeking to affect market prices could perform. 111 After all, “[t]he
methods and techniques of manipulation are limited only by the ingenuity of
man.” 112 The analysis of whether manipulation has occurred in a commodities
market is usually highly fact-specific. 113
Although the CEA’s anti-manipulation jurisprudence has been described as
“a murky miasma of questionable analysis and unclear effect,” 114 a four-part test
has emerged which federal courts and the CFTC use to evaluate manipulation on
commodity futures markets. 115 Under the four-part test, the following elements
must be established by a preponderance of the evidence before a court will
determine that manipulation has occurred on a commodity futures market: (1) the
accused had the ability to influence market prices; (2) the accused specifically
intended to influence market prices; (3) artificial prices existed; and (4) the
Moreover, a claim of attempted
accused caused the artificial prices. 116
manipulation requires proof of the following two elements: (1) intent to affect
market prices; and (2) an overt act in furtherance thereof. 117
The legal test for manipulation and attempted manipulation under the CEA is
an extraordinarily difficult test to apply. 118 The difficulty is due to the resourceexclusive jurisdiction with respect to accounts, agreements, and transactions (including options)
involving contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery. Id.
109
Volkart Bros., Inc., v. Freeman, 311 F.2d 52, 58 (5th Cir. 1962).
110
7 U.S.C. at § 13(a)(2), (b)(2).
111
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YALE J. ON REG. 281, 360 (1991).
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E.g., CFTC v. Amaranth Advisors, L.L.C., 554 F. Supp. 2d 523, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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For in-depth analyses of the four-part test, see generally EMILIOS AVGOULEAS, THE
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intensive investigation required, the complexity between the market variables
involved in an artificial price and the mind-reading problems of proving intent,
among other challenges. 119 The conceptual vagueness of these elements makes
their application a “daunting, indeed impossible, task for the CFTC staff.” 120
According to one commentator, manipulation in commodities markets is “virtually
an unprosecutable crime” due to the difficulty of applying the CEA’s antimanipulation doctrine. 121 As hard as it is to apply the doctrine to commodity
exchange markets, it is downright incoherent to apply the doctrine to political
prediction markets.
B. The Incoherence of “Artificial Price”
The elements of the CEA’s anti-manipulation doctrine hinge on the concept
of an artificial price. There is no single test for what constitutes an artificial price
in a commodity futures market. Every test presents its own problems—commodity
futures market scholars find that the task of defining what constitutes an artificial
price is “a very perilous exercise.” 122 Despite the difficulties, it appears that three
of the predominant tests that courts and the CFTC have developed for “artificial
price” in commodity futures markets depend upon the relationship between the
futures contract and the value of an “underlying cash asset,” 123 and two of the tests
depend upon a “historical relationship” between similar futures contracts compared
against each other in different time periods. 124 In the political prediction market
context, the concepts of underlying cash asset and historical relationships are
incoherent. Therefore, the main five tests for artificial price developed under the
CEA all fail to analogize meaningfully to political prediction markets.
Regarding the underlying cash asset relationship, the first test defines an
artificial price as a price that diverges from basic forces of supply and demand. 125
The standard technique to determine whether the basic forces of supply and
demand are being violated in a commodity futures market is to look for squeezes
and corners in the underlying deliverable assets. 126 A “corner” is a situation where
Markets: Redefining the Offense, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 345 (1987); Craig Pirrong, Commodity Market
Manipulation Law: A (Very) Critical Analysis and a Proposed Alternative, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
945 (1994).
119
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120
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124
In re Cox, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 23,786, at 34,064-66
(C.F.T.C. 1987) (analyzing “Historical Market Comparisons” and “Cash Market Price Comparisons” in
assessing whether price was artificial); Great W. Food Distrib., Inc. v. Brannan, 201 F.2d 476, 482-83
(7th Cir. 1953) (discussing the three methods that the government sought to show an abnormal price in
egg futures); Benjamin E. Kozinn, Note, The Great Copper Caper: Is Market Manipulation Really a
Problem in the Wake of the Sumitomo Debacle?, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 243, 261-62 n.146 (2000)
(citing Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1167-68 (8th Cir. 1971) (addressing the various
approaches that the government argued demonstrated the existence of an artificial price)).
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Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1163 (8th Cir. 1971).
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Markets: The Ferruzzi Soybean Episode, 6 AM. L. &. ECON. REV. 28 (2004); Craig Pirrong,
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a trader “intentionally causes a price to rise by acquiring a dominant position in the
futures market and simultaneously achieving sufficient dominance in the cash
market ‘to dry up the sources of deliverable goods.’” 127 A “squeeze” is a situation
in which “the open interest on the futures market is considerably in excess of the
deliverable supplies.” 128 The concepts of corners and squeezes both concern
abuses of the basic force of supply and demand, and both concepts are inextricably
linked to cash markets for the underlying commodity. Political prediction markets
lack this link to a cash market, and thus the supply and demand test is incoherent
as applied to political prediction markets.
Moreover, the concept of manipulation based upon a violation of supply and
demand forces is itself troublesome. This is because the concept rests on the
paradoxical notion that there is no such thing as an artificial price if all market
forces that contribute to shaping a price are considered to be part of legitimate
supply and demand. 129 As one scholar explains, “After all, the trader is a part of
the market. If he believes a commodity is under priced and seeks advantage, who
is to say that the resulting price is artificial?” 130
A second test compares the futures price to the cash prices of the
commodity. 131 Commodity futures contracts require physical delivery of the
commodity as a means of settlement. 132 This requirement is important because it
causes futures prices and cash prices to converge. 133 This convergence occurs
because arbitrage is profitable when a price disparity exists, but the arbitrage
transactions themselves will ultimately force cash and futures price
convergence. 134 Whereas a commodity futures contract has a connection to an
actual physical commodity that can be delivered in the future or immediately
received for cash, the political event forming the basis of the political prediction
market contract has no relationship to any underlying physical commodity that can
be traded instantly in a cash market or physically delivered in the future. Political
prediction markets are even more abstract than futures trading in intangible goods
such as stock index futures contracts, because at least with stock index futures the
trader “receives a cash settlement based on the theoretical results of his having
bought or sold that basket of stocks.” 135 Due to the absence of a cash market basis
and delivery in the political prediction market context, this second test is also
incoherent when applied to political prediction markets.

Manipulation of the Commodity Futures Market Delivery Process, 66 J. BUS. 335, 335-69 (1993)).
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Additionally, a third test analyzes the historical price relationship between
different Boards of Trade. 136 Under this test, the price of commodity futures
contracts in one market during a given time frame is compared with the price of
the same type of commodity futures contracts in a different market during the same
time frame. 137 This test is problematic when applied to political prediction
markets, because these markets lack any cash basis by which to compare market
prices. Direct comparisons between the same types of political event contracts in
the same time period on different political prediction markets do not account for
whether the benchmark of comparison in any of the markets represents the “true”
value of the contract. A cash market basis is essential for this third test to provide
a meaningful basis of comparison, and the test therefore cannot apply to political
prediction markets.
Moving on to the historical relationship puzzle, a fourth test for artificial
prices in commodity futures markets compares “the price changes of the suspect
contract during the suspect period with price changes of the same type of contract
during the same historical period.” 138 Under this test, we compare the contract’s
price during the “suspect period” with the contract’s price movements during the
same period in earlier years. 139 A fifth test for artificial price in commodity futures
markets evaluates “price movement in the spread . . . in comparison to price
changes in the previous years’ spreads.” 140 This test compares the price difference
between the futures contract in a particular commodity in one given month as well
as in the subsequent month. 141
While these two historical relationship tests may be sensible in commodity
futures markets, where the commodities are often agricultural products 142 that are
traded seasonally year after year, both of these tests are incoherent in the political
prediction market context. This is because the event forming the basis of the
political prediction market contract is unique under the strictest meaning of the
word. 143 Political events do not have repetitive, cyclical “harvesting” periods.
Each particular nomination or election can occur only once.
Although it is true that elections generally occur according to cyclical,
predictable schedules pursuant to the expiration of pre-determined terms of office,
the infinite distinct variables surrounding a political election thwart direct
historical comparison between election cycles, even when the same candidate is
involved. It is not fruitful, for example, to analyze the price fluctuations of a
“George W. Bush will be elected President in 2000” contract’s price with the price
fluctuations of a “George W. Bush will be elected President in 2004” contract’s
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price. Although both markets concern the same candidate for U.S. President, the
political environments and variance in overall candidate pools were different
enough to make direct historical price comparison meaningless.
Since the doctrines of artificial price that courts and the CFTC have
developed in light of the CEA’s anti-manipulation jurisprudence are incoherent
when applied to political prediction markets, the CFTC cannot utilize this
jurisprudence if it acquires jurisdiction to regulate political prediction markets. As
we see next, the CEA’s doctrinal concept of specific intent to influence market
price is also incoherent when applied to political prediction markets.
C. The Incoherence of “Specific Intent to Influence Market Price”
The element of specific intent to influence market price is the most elusive
component of the current CEA anti-manipulation doctrine in the commodity
futures market context, due to its circumstantial and subjective nature. After all,
“it is hard to read people’s minds.” 144 Despite the difficulties that arise in defining
specific intent to influence market prices in commodities markets, the underlying
basic premise is that manipulators intend to affect the market such that they can
buy a commodity futures contract at a low price and sell at a high price. 145 As we
will see, this basic premise is incoherent when applied to political prediction
markets, because as illustrated in Part III, manipulative traders in political
prediction markets seek to change the price of the contract in order to influence
external beliefs about the candidate’s viability. In the commodity futures market
context, price change for profit is the manipulator’s end in itself. In the political
prediction market context, price change for profit or loss is a means to the
secondary end of influencing beliefs.
Commodities market scholar Wendy Collins Perdue starts with the basic
premise of the CEA’s anti-manipulation doctrine that rational investors try to buy a
commodity futures contract at a low price and sell at a high price. 146 Perdue
explains that a rational, non-manipulative trader seeks to minimize the price
impacts of his own trades on the commodity futures markets, because doing so will
enable the trader to obtain the best price. 147 This is because the rational, nonmanipulative trader wants to purchase the contract for the lowest possible price in
order to obtain the greatest possible profit upon sale at a higher price.
Perdue suggests that a trader may indicate manipulative intent when the
trader purchases a large quantity of a commodity contract and does so in a manner
that seems designed specifically to increase the price impact of that purchase. 148
Another indication of manipulative intent is “reaching,” which occurs “when the
trader makes a bid at a price that is substantially higher, (or lower) than the last bid
or transaction.” 149 Either activity comports with basic economic rationality,
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because it is the manipulative trader’s goal to make a monetary profit off of the
market-based trades.
However, Perdue’s analysis is problematic when applied to the context of
political prediction markets, because her basic premise—that rational traders on
commodities futures markets try to buy low and sell high—does not apply to the
manipulation relevant to political prediction markets. As illustrated in Part III,
traders in political prediction markets will purchase event contracts in order to
influence the beliefs of other market observers, and ultimately policy decisions. It
would be politically rational, though not economically rational under the CEA’s
manipulation doctrine, for a political prediction market trader to try to force the
price of the contract down if the trader’s object was to indicate that a particular
candidate was falling out of popular favor. Prediction market scholar Robin
Hanson observes that people will make trades on public prediction markets that
lose money in order to change prices and therefore policy. 150 Hanson writes,
“[e]ven if such trades lost money on average, those losses might be outweighed by
gains from more favorable policy.” 151 Whereas manipulation in a political
prediction market is rational if it influences external political belief, manipulation
in a traditional commodities market is rational only if it results in the trader’s own
monetary gain. The two types of manipulation are not analogous.
Ironically, it is likely politically irrational for traders in political prediction
markets to structure their trades with the intent to influence beliefs. Empirical
research suggests that even the secondary goal of influencing beliefs is not likely
to be accomplished through contract trading in political prediction markets. While
some prediction market traders engage in trade-based manipulation with the intent
to influence external beliefs, an experiment by prediction market researchers
suggests that “price manipulation is a largely ineffective strategy for altering the
beliefs of investors and other decision makers.” 152 Although the experiment was
designed to provide manipulation incentives to some market participants while
other participants were “kept in the dark about the direction in which manipulation
incentives ran,” the manipulation did not reduce the accuracy of the third party
observers’ forecasts. 153 The manipulative trader’s efforts to influence the third
parties’ beliefs were ineffective, and the effort was an economic and political
waste.
In another prediction market experiment, researchers discovered that within
limited boundaries of experimental design, when a non-manipulative market
participant suspects the presence of prediction market manipulators and knows the
direction in which the manipulators are likely to push the price, the manipulation
efforts are ineffective. 154 This experiment was limited to situations in which all
the participants knew that prediction market manipulators were present, how
strong the incentive to manipulate was, and in which direction the manipulators
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had an incentive to push the price. 155
The authors acknowledge that the experimental conditions of this research
should be altered in future experimental designs, to uncover more information
about the robustness of prediction markets to manipulative trading designed to
influence external beliefs of other market participants or observers. 156
Nonetheless, these studies suggest that it does not matter whether prediction
market traders share the same rational basis to buy low and sell high as
commodities market traders, because even if prediction market traders trade to
influence policy rather than maximize personal economic profits pursuant to the
CEA’s anti-manipulation doctrine, such efforts are likely to be ineffective
anyway. 157
This Part has argued that the concepts of artificial price and specific intent to
influence market price as developed under the CEA’s anti-manipulation
jurisprudence are incoherent when applied to political prediction markets.
Therefore, the CFTC must abandon the CEA’s regime if it acquires jurisdiction
over political prediction markets. Part V suggests three different alternatives to the
CEA regime to address the issue of manipulation in political prediction markets.
V. THREE ALTERNATIVES FOR PREVENTING MANIPULATION IN POLITICAL
PREDICTION MARKETS
Part IV demonstrated that the concept of manipulation under the CEA’s antimanipulation doctrine is incoherent when applied to political prediction markets
due to the nature of the concepts of artificial price and specific intent to influence
market prices as developed under the CEA’s jurisprudence. Part V now presents
three alternatives to the CEA’s regime that the CFTC can choose to adopt if it
acquires jurisdiction over political prediction markets. These three alternatives
are: (1) the CFTC can develop a revised anti-manipulation doctrine with elements
that are coherent when applied to political election markets; (2) the CFTC can
encourage private contracting between market participants to prohibit certain
trading activities; or (3) the CFTC can take no action and simply allow political
prediction markets themselves to control manipulation through self-deterrence
mechanisms.
A. Designing a New Regulatory Regime
Since the anti-manipulation doctrine involving artificial price and specific
intent to influence market prices under the CEA is incoherent when applied to
political prediction markets, the CFTC and courts may develop a new set of tests to
apply when analyzing whether a trader has manipulated or attempted to manipulate
a political prediction market.
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One approach is for the courts and the CFTC to develop a set of objective
factors that can be observed and discovered ex post. 158 The ex post approach
avoids the “mind reading” exercise typically involved in discerning specific intent.
Under the ex post approach, where it is found that a trader engaged in specific
prohibited practices in the political prediction markets, CFTC regulation would be
necessary, but the trader’s intent to influence the beliefs of outside observers
would only be relevant at the sanctions stage. 159
Several ex post factors that the CFTC and the courts could analyze to discern
whether a trader attempted to manipulate a political prediction markets are 1)
whether the purchase price of the contract was substantially above the market
price; 2) whether the purchases were made rapidly at increasingly higher prices; 3)
whether extremely large purchases were made relative to the market as a whole; 160
4) whether a single trader spent a significant amount of money on contracts for a
single candidate; 5) whether the resulting price of the candidate’s contract after the
trade is significantly different from the political poll data for that candidate; 6)
whether arbitrage opportunities existed between different political prediction
market boards of trade after the attempted manipulative trading has occurred; 7)
whether the trader in question is affiliated with a political party; 8) whether the
candidate endorses policies that would personally benefit or hurt the trader or
parties in privity with the trader; and 9) whether the trader has a history of
contributing to political campaigns.
None of these ex post factors would be outcome-determinative as to whether
the trader attempted to manipulate the political prediction market. However, they
at least provide some starting factors that the CFTC and courts could consider in
combination when analyzing whether the trader engaged in manipulation with the
ultimate intent to influence the beliefs of external market observers.
Rather than prevent market manipulation with criteria that identifies
problematic objective behaviors indicative of manipulative intent ex post, some
scholars argue that unwanted market behavior should be policed ex ante through
the use of affirmative regulation. 161 Writing in the context of combating
manipulation in commodity future markets, Jerry Markham argues that the CFTC
should engage in intensive surveillance. 162 This surveillance would continue
throughout the life of the commodity futures contract, in order, for example, “to
see if large traders are affecting prices through their trades and whether these
positions are so large that they should be required to liquidate well before the
delivery period.” 163 In addition to this intensive daily surveillance, Markham
proposes limits on the amount of short trading that any one commodity futures
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trader can engage in on a single day, 164 and advocates for an automatic order
execution system for small orders that would minimize petty theft. 165
As a policy matter, Markham argues that strict affirmative regulation is
required in the commodity futures market context for the trading public to gain
confidence in the “highly innovative and still-growing futures industry.” 166
Markham writes that the alternative to aggressive, affirmative regulation is “to
declare that the manipulation of commodity prices is an unprosecutable crime in
which traders may engage with no regard for the effect upon the consumer and the
economy in general.” 167 His tone suggests that it would be disgraceful for our
government to concede that manipulation is unprosecutable. 168
Markham’s argument in favor of ex ante affirmative regulation is powerful
in the political prediction market context, because public acceptance of the markets
as legitimate is crucial if these markets are to grow on a large scale. The mere fact
that prediction markets are novel, complex and anonymous causes some concern
for market abuse. 169 John Delaney, the CEO of Intrade.com, is concerned enough
about the effect of political prediction market “manipulation” on public confidence
in these markets that he has solicited feedback on the matter in a public online
forum. 170
Several scholars have posited reasons why manipulation in public prediction
markets is troubling. The most emotionally compelling argument against
manipulation of prediction markets is that it undermines potential market
participants’ belief in the integrity of the market, and therefore discourages them
from participating. 171 Eric Zitzewitz points out, “[p]eople have a taste for
institutional integrity itself.” 172 Zitzewitz also notes that the possibility for
manipulation creates bad incentive effects, and manipulation relies on surprise,
which is a source of vexation for honest prediction market participants. 173
However, Markham’s approach to affirmative ex ante regulation has several
drawbacks. First, even Markham acknowledges that the greatest danger from this
type of affirmative regulation is that it “might strangle the markets and stifle
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innovation.” 174 There is a risk that potential traders will be overly-deterred from
participation due to fear of legal repercussions for “questionable” trades. 175 In a
newly developing field such as political prediction markets, it is desirable to invite
wide participation without threatening participants with stiff regulations that will
prevent them from exploring and experimenting with this new market medium.
Second, some commentators fear that Markham’s approach to strong
government regulation could obscure the underlying economic information on
commodity futures markets. Robert Lower argues, “[w]ith the CFTC acting as a
‘hands-on’ policeman and occasional market participant, the markets could easily
become governed by political considerations having nothing to do with the
economic factors affecting price.” 176 Political actors would seek to control the
price of commodities having a disproportionately influential effect in their
constituents’ region. 177
Lower’s worry suggests that governmental regulatory intervention will
obscure the underlying prediction price data, thus resulting in inferior predictive
ability of these markets. 178 Analogizing to the political prediction market context,
Gary Becker fears that political prediction markets with distorted underlying price
data are less reliable as predictors of outcomes. 179 These considerations indicate
that aggressive affirmative regulation of prediction markets is not the best solution
to manipulation in political prediction markets.
B. Private Contract Solutions
Rather than monitor manipulation in the political prediction market through
either ex post or ex ante regulation, the CFTC could encourage private contractual
solutions to curb manipulative trading activities. Private contract solutions provide
an alternative to aggressive governmental regulation of manipulation in public
prediction markets. Gaining insight from the commodities market context, some
scholars have argued that governmental regulation of commodity futures market
manipulation is unnecessary because the exchanges that offer these futures
contracts have a private incentive to regulate manipulation. 180 To attract business,
compete with other exchanges, and compete with other securities markets, private
exchanges have the incentive to adopt contract terms and trading rules that reduce
the costs of manipulation. 181
This observation is easily applied to the prediction market context generally.
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In fact, Cantor Futures Exchange, L.P. (“Cantor”), presumably in anticipation of
imminent CFTC regulation of public prediction markets, recently filed an
application with the CFTC to become a fully regulated futures exchange. 182 In its
application, Cantor expressed its intent to list contracts on domestic movie box
office receipts. 183 This course of action would constitute a public prediction
market in which traders predict the total gross domestic box office receipts in the
United States and Canada in U.S. dollars. 184 Notably, Cantor’s application
includes private contractual provisions to control manipulation on its box office
exchange. 185
Box office receipt prediction markets can suffer from the same types of
manipulation as political prediction markets. Traders in box office receipt
contracts may seek to influence the beliefs of outside observers as to the movie’s
commercial appeal and success to persuade others to attend the film in the theater.
Unfortunately, Cantor does not define the term manipulation in its application. If
the private contractual solutions were applied to political prediction markets,
parties would be well-advised to define manipulation clearly to avoid the
interpretive difficulties discussed in Part IV.
Although private contracts avoid some of the problems associated with
aggressive governmental regulation, these private contractual solutions pose
several problems of their own. As Fischel and Ross acknowledge in the
commodities market context, “rules designed to prevent the exercise of market
power also reduce the return to information about future prices and thus reduce the
incentive for market participants to gather such information.” 186 This reduction in
information gathering incentives would be highly problematic in the political
prediction market context, in which the incentive to gather information is one of
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the prime virtues of such a market. 187
Another problem is whether the private contractual rules adopted by the
public prediction market exchange will adopt the optimal amount of precautions
against manipulation, however it is defined. 188 The optimal precaution level
against manipulation in private contractual agreement occurs when the marginal
private gains equal the marginal private costs, and the private gains and costs
approximate the social gains and costs. 189
In the commodities market context, scholars disagree about whether the level
of precautions against manipulation undertaken by private contracting parties will
approximate the social gains and costs. On the one hand, some believe this
convergence is likely because “traders on the futures market are those who bear
most of the costs and receive most of the gains from trading in these markets.” 190
If the privately contracting traders capture nearly all the benefits or burdens of the
trades resulting from private agreement, then the private and social costs do
converge almost completely.
On the other hand, some scholars are concerned that the private contractors
will not take the optimal amount of precautions because “exchanges do not take
into account the interests of those who are affected by futures prices but do not
participate in the futures market.” 191 The dispute here is whether the privately
contracting traders do in fact capture all (or nearly all) of the benefits of the
contract themselves, and whether they need to be concerned with the interests of
outside market observers.
Fischel and Ross dispose of this concern by arguing that private contracts
formed between traders do take into account the needs of outside market
observers. 192 This is because outside observers of commodities markets (such as
farmers who look at futures prices to determine how much to plant) participate in
spot markets for the commodity. 193 They explain that “[s]peculators in futures
markets take positions that ensure that futures prices reflect the information in spot
markets (and vice versa)” and that “[t]his interaction between spot and futures
markets may provide incentives for exchanges to take the spot market into account
in determining what precautions to take.” 194
The issue of whether privately contracting parties will adopt the optimal
level of precautions against manipulation in the political prediction market context
raises particular difficulties in light of Fischel and Ross’s theories. First of all,
whereas in the commodity futures context it is at least arguable that the privately
contracting parties capture nearly all the benefits or burdens of the trades resulting
from the private agreement, this notion is false in the political prediction market
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context. As discussed in Part III, 195 concerns about manipulation in political
prediction markets are based upon the influence of the trades on external market
observers. Outside observers look at the market prices to analyze the viability of a
political candidate, and this can influence the outsider’s own votes. Therefore it is
not a colorable argument to suggest that private and social costs will converge
completely through private contracting where political prediction markets are
concerned.
Secondly, the solution by which Fischel and Ross dispose of the optimal
precaution concern cannot be analogized to political prediction markets. Whereas
Fischel and Ross argue that the existence of a spot market provides incentives for
private contracting parties to adopt the optimal precautions against manipulation in
commodity futures markets, there is no analogous spot market for the events
underlying political prediction markets. In a commodities market a trader can, for
example, simultaneously purchase frozen orange juice concentrate immediately on
a spot market as well as purchase futures contracts for the frozen concentrate. In
contrast, a trader on the political prediction market cannot simultaneously discern
the final vote counts of an actual election while purchasing contracts on the
political prediction market for the same exact election.
These failures of analogy between private contractual solution for
manipulation in commodity futures markets and political prediction markets
suggest that private contracts would not solve the problems of manipulation in
political prediction markets. If affirmative government regulation and private
contractual solutions both fail in the political prediction market context, perhaps a
third solution—self-deterrence—can solve the problem of manipulation in these
markets. We now turn to this possibility.
C. Self-Deterrence of Manipulative Trading
In the context of commodity futures markets, Fischel and Ross offer an
argument that manipulation on commodity futures markets is self-deterring and
thus not in need of a regulatory regime. First, they observe that the acquisition of
market power requires a large amount of capital, and this by itself is a deterrent to
manipulative efforts. 196 Second, they argue that manipulation on commodity
markets is self-deterring because of how risky such efforts are. A manipulator
must withhold supplies of a commodity to cause a price increase, but such
behavior is risky because after the futures contract expires, the demand is likely to
be much more elastic. 197 The manipulator does not necessarily have the ability to
obtain a high price for the contract after its expiration. 198 Therefore, the would-be
manipulator “has no assurance that the price at expiration will yield him a profit,”
and thus attempted manipulations in futures markets are “extremely risky.” 199
The concept of manipulation on political prediction markets is also likely
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self-deterring. The cost of manipulation is high, 200 the chance of profiting
financially is low, 201 and the prices are usually altered for only a short period of
time. 202 Alert market participants can profit off the manipulated prices, so the
manipulator essentially subsidizes the profit-making ability of the nonmanipulators. 203 Moreover, as expressed in Part IV.C, price manipulation is
largely ineffective in influencing the beliefs of observers outside the market. 204
Saul Levmore supports the self-deterrence theory by observing, “[M]uch as
there is money to be made in manipulation, there is money to be made in countermanipulation.” 205 He explains that the market itself will generate “corrective
entrepreneurs and activities” that oppose manipulation, and that the free market
will “prove superior to government-sponsored regulators even at the task of
regulation itself.” 206 The self-deterrence theory concludes that because market
forces and private incentives make manipulative attempts costly, risky, and
ineffective, market manipulators will be deterred from attempting to engage in
such activities. Governmental regulation of these activities would be superfluous,
costly, and unnecessary.
VI. CONCLUSION: URGING REGULATORY RESTRAINT
This Article has argued that the CEA’s current anti-manipulation doctrine is
incoherent as applied to political prediction markets. 207 Additionally, it has
suggested that both aggressive governmental regulation and private contractual
solutions are problematic. 208 Self-deterrence within the market structure itself may
be the best solution for preventing manipulation in political predication markets. 209
For this reason, the CFTC should exercise restraint in designing an antimanipulation regime towards political prediction markets, if it acquires jurisdiction
over these markets. Beyond the possibility that self-deterrence is the best solution,
this Article concludes with an additional reason why the CFTC should exercise
regulatory restraint: empirical experiments suggest that manipulation may actually
improve the predictive accuracy of these markets.
Robin Hanson explains that the low impact of manipulation in prediction
markets is due to the high level of “noise trades” in these markets. 210 Trades are
made in these markets that have nothing to do with the underlying information;
rather, trades are made because of mental mistakes, insurance purposes, or other
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non-informational reasons. 211 Manipulation is merely another type of noise
trading, and those traders holding real information have the opportunity to make a
profit off of those participants who are trading for reasons other than for revealing
accurate information about the underlying event probability. 212 Moreover,
manipulation “should not add any systematic bias, and the prospect of
manipulation should increase liquidity and thus reduce noise overall.” 213
Hanson observes that non-manipulative participants will alter their behavior
in two ways to profit off of the manipulative or “noise traders.” First, they will
trade at a higher volume for any information they hold because doing so will
increase their expected profits. 214 Second, and most significantly, they will
increase their efforts to obtain relevant and accurate information to beat the price
set by the manipulative trader. 215
The second behavior is important because these efforts to obtain accurate
information mean that on average, more noise trading should increase price
accuracy. 216 Hanson explains that empirically “it seems that financial and
information markets with more noise trading, and hence a large trading volume,
tend to be more accurate, all else being equal.” 217 This is because the presence of
manipulative traders induces more effort by informed traders, and this explains the
typical failure of most manipulation attempts. 218
In one of Hanson and Oprea’s empirical studies, the authors discovered that
in a thin prediction market with a known manipulator possessing definite price
objectives, the presence of the manipulator actually increased the accuracy of the
market price. 219 The presence of a manipulator motivated other traders to gather
information, and this additional information resulted in greater expected financial
rewards for the non-manipulative traders. 220 The manipulator’s known presence
therefore “indirectly increases the accuracy of the market price as an estimate of
fundamental asset value.” 221 Although their experiment focused on thin prediction
markets, Hanson and Oprea note that the largest financial markets have the most
accurate information and prices because other traders who anticipate a large
volume of noise trades in the larger market will change their trading behavior in
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response. 222
These empirical findings indicate that manipulation might actually be good
for political prediction markets. Additional research is needed, but in the
meantime such data suggests that the CFTC, if it acquires jurisdiction, should not
hastily seek to regulate apparently manipulative trading on political prediction
markets if doing so will prevent these markets from reaching their most accurate
potential.
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